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On 29 November 2016 the House of Representatives of the States General adopted the 
following motion:  
 
‘The House,  
 
having heard the deliberations,  
 
observing that the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe and the United States House of Representatives have characterised the 
atrocities committed by ISIS against Yazidis, Kurds, Christians and other ethnic and 
religious minorities, and against Muslims who disagree with ISIS’ extremist 
interpretation of Islam, as crimes against humanity and genocide;  
 
considering that establishing whether conduct meets the legal definition of genocide 
is always a determination to be made by a court but that such determinations often 
take years, while the political recognition that the crime has been committed is of 
great importance, not least because it enables the affected groups to process their 
grief;  
 
requests that the government commission an advisory opinion from the External 
Adviser on Public International Law (Extern Volkenrechtelijk Adviseur, EVA) and 
the Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (Commissie van 
advies inzake volkenrechtelijke vraagstukken, CAVV) and ask that they prepare a 
joint report for the purpose of creating clarity regarding the scope for and the 
desirability and significance of the use of the term “genocide” by politicians, in 
general and in relation to the aforementioned atrocities in the Middle East.’ 
 
In his letter of 19 December 2016 the Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the External 
Adviser on Public International Law (EVA) and the Advisory Committee on Issues of 
Public International Law (CAVV) to prepare a joint advisory report in accordance with the 
motion. The minister added that, in view of the deliberations on the motion in the House of 
Representatives, the use of the term ‘crimes against humanity’ could also be examined in 
the report, if so desired. Given the topicality of this issue, the minister requested that the 
advisory report be issued by 1 March 2017 if possible. 
 
A draft report was drawn up by the EVA, Professor P.A. Nollkaemper, and by Professor 
L.J. van den Herik, Professor J.G. Lammers and Dr G.R. den Dekker of the CAVV. The 
CAVV discussed the structure of the report on 23 February 2017. In addition, a procedure 
allowing all CAVV members to respond to draft versions of the advisory report by email 






1. Introduction: point of departure and key terms  
This advisory report examines the scope for and the significance and desirability of the use 
of the term ‘genocide’ by politicians. In accordance with the minister’s suggestion, the 
term ‘crimes against humanity’ will also be examined in the report.  
 
The question of how politicians in general and parliament in particular use terms defined in 
public international law and the implications of that usage is not unique to the terms 
‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’. This issue can arise in a variety of contexts, 
including with regard to intervention, the use of force, aggression or war crimes. For 
instance, parliamentary debates about the Netherlands’ contribution to missions in Iraq and 
Syria include implicit and explicit determinations pertaining to the legitimacy of the use of 
force from the perspective of international law. In accordance with the request for advice, 
the advisory report will address only the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’.  
 
Before the issues of scope, significance and desirability are addressed, the meaning of the 
key terms used in the report will be explained in this introduction. 
 
In order to answer the question posed in the motion, it is important to define what is meant 
by the word ‘politicians’. To begin with, this advisory report refers only to politicians at the 
central level of the state, to the exclusion of politicians at other levels of government. The 
report also makes a distinction between politicians who are members of government and 
politicians who are members of parliament. The focus is on the latter group and, more 
specifically, on motions that can be adopted by parliament and as such can be considered to 
convey parliament’s position. This choice is in keeping with the examples given in the first 
paragraph of the motion upon which the request for advice is based. Positions of individual 
politicians expressed within parliament or elsewhere (for example, in the media) fall 
outside the scope of this report.  
 
The request for advice refers to ‘the use’ of the term genocide by politicians in reference to 
particular crimes. In this report, the EVA and the CAVV use the phrase ‘determination of 
genocide’. In this context, making a ‘determination’ means judging that a particular set of 
circumstances amounts to genocide. As explained in sections 3 and 4, the legal 
consequences under public international law hinge on the nature of the expression and the 
actor. 
 
It is also important to define the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’. Genocide 
is defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.0F1 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court contains the same definition.1F2 
According to this definition, genocide covers a number of crimes committed with intent to 
destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Genocide therefore concerns not just 
crimes against a group, but crimes specifically committed with the intention of destroying 
                                                 
1 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, p. 277, Dutch Treaty Series 1960, 32, amended by Dutch Treaty 
Series 1966, 179. 
2 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2187, p. 3, Dutch Treaty Series 2000, 120, amended by Dutch Treaty 
Series 2013, 13; 2011, 73. 
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the group as such. The Rome Statute contains an additional dimension in that the crimes 
must have taken place in the context of a manifest pattern of conduct that threatens the 
existence of the group as such.2F3  
 
Unlike the position with regard to genocide, there is no general convention on crimes 
against humanity. A definition of crimes against humanity can now be found in the Rome 
Statute and the general consensus is that this definition is largely consistent with customary 
international law. According to this definition, crimes against humanity are acts committed 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack.3F4 Such crimes can be committed in times of war and of peace.  
 
Genocide and crimes against humanity are closely related in terms of the development of 
the law and by their nature. There is also a degree of overlap in terms of substance. For acts 
to be characterised as genocide or crimes against humanity they must be committed 
systematically or on a certain scale. State involvement is not necessarily a requirement. 
Such acts can also be committed by non-state actors and groups. However, there is as yet 
no definitive answer to the question of what type of non-state groups can commit these 
offences. Important criteria mentioned in the debate on crimes against humanity are 
organisational structure, having the resources and capability to mount attacks, the group’s 
objective and the acts committed by the group.4F5  
 
Before the questions concerning scope, significance and desirability posed in the motion 
are addressed (in sections 3, 4 and 5, respectively) a number of examples will be given in 
the next section to illustrate parliamentary practice with respect to making determinations 
of genocide and/or crimes against humanity. 
 
  
                                                 
3 The ICC’s Elements of Crimes sums up the elements of the crimes the Court prosecutes. With regard to 
genocide, the Elements of Crimes states the following requirement: ‘The conduct took place in the context of 
a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such 
destruction.’ See also Prosecutor v. Bashir, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest 
against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, paras. 124-125. The ICTY rejected the requirement 
that a determination of genocide depends on the relevant conduct presenting a concrete threat to the existence 
of the targeted group. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Krstić, 19 April 2004, para. 224 and Prosecutor v. Popović et al., 
10 June 2010, para. 829. 
4 Various underlying acts can be characterised as crimes against humanity if they were perpetrated as part of 
an attack of this nature, including wilful killing, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, 
torture, rape and sexual slavery, persecution, enforced disappearance of a person, the crime of apartheid. 
5 See Christopher Hall / Kai Ambos, Commentary on Article 7, in The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court; A Commentary, 3rd edition, Beck, Hart, Nomos, paras. 109-110, and the references to 
relevant case law there.  
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2. The practice of other parliaments 
As the motion observes, there are multiple examples of situations in which parliaments 
have made determinations of genocide or of crimes against humanity.  
 
In 1987 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the Armenian Question stating 
that the events of 1915–1917 constituted genocide within the meaning of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.5F6 The European Parliament 
also recognised the persecution of Roma by Nazi Germany during the Second World War6F7 
and the events in Srebrenica of July 19957F8 as genocide. In a resolution adopted in 2016, the 
European Parliament stated that Islamic State (IS) is committing genocide against 
Christians, Yazidis and other religious and ethnic minorities, and urged states to fulfil their 
obligations under international law (including the Genocide Convention).8F9 
 
Members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issue written 
declarations with some regularity characterising the Armenian Question as genocide.9F10 In a 
1994 resolution the Parliamentary Assembly also referred to the acts of Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraqi regime against the Maʻdān (Marsh Arabs) as genocide.10F11 In a resolution adopted in 
2016 the Assembly urged states to act on the assumption that Islamic State (IS) is 
committing genocide and to fulfil their obligations under the Genocide Convention.11F12 
 
The US House of Representatives and the US Senate have used the term ‘genocide’ in the 
Armenian context,12F13 and in the context of events in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995), 
in particular in Srebrenica.13F14 The US House of Representatives and/or the US Senate have 
also used the term ‘genocide’ in other cases, primarily in the context of the protection of 
religious and ethnic minorities in the Middle East. For example, Congress has called for the 
acts of Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria, in particular those targeting Christians and 
Yazidis, to be recognised as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.14F15  
 
Parliaments of a number of other states have also made determinations of past and present 
acts of genocide. For example, the parliaments of France and Germany have characterised 
the mass murder of Armenians in 1915 as genocide,15F16 and Sweden’s parliament included 
the attacks against the Assyrians in the same period.16F17 The question of whether the mass 
killings in Namibia should also be designated as genocide was answered in the affirmative 
                                                 
6 EP Resolution, 18 June 1987, OJ C 190, p. 119. Repeated in others, including EP Resolution 15 April 2015, 
2015/2590 (RSP). 
7 EP Resolution, 15 April 2015, 2015/2615 (RSP). 
8 Inter alia EP Resolution, 9 July 2015, 2015/2747 (RSP). 
9 EP Resolution, 4 February 2016, 2016/2529 (RSP). 
10 E.g. Doc. 13770, Written Declaration no. 591, 23 April 2015, 171 signatories.  
11 Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1022 (1994), 27 January 1994. 
12 Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 2091 (2016), 27 January 2016. 
13 House Joint Resolution no. 148, 9 April 1975 and House Joint Resolution no. 247, 12 September 1984. 
14 House Resolution 310, 8 July 2015. 
15 House Concurrent Resolution 75, 14 March 2016; Senate Resolution 340, 7 July 2016. 
16 See Loi nº 2001-70, 29 January 2001, J.O. of 30 January 2001, p. 1590 and Deutscher Bundestag, 
Plenarprotokoll 18/173, Stenografischer Bericht, 173. Sitzung, 2 June 2016, pp. 17027-17039. 
17 Sveriges Riksdag, Riksdagens protokoll 2009/10:86, 11 March 2010. 
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by the German government at the urging of the German parliament.17F18 Another example is 
the 1932-33 famine in Ukraine, known as the Holodomor, which the Ukrainian parliament 
characterised as genocide in 2006.18F19 
 
A more recent example is a motion adopted by the UK House of Commons concerning the 
violence against Christians and other minorities in Syria and Iraq. It bluntly observes that 
‘this disgusting behaviour clearly falls within the definition of genocide’.19F20 The Canadian 
parliament adopted a motion in October 2016 characterising the violence against the 
Yazidis as genocide and referring to the report issued by the United Nations Commission 
of Inquiry on Syria of June 2016.20F21  
 
Occasionally, determinations by parliaments are linked to proposals to introduce a day of 
remembrance marking a specific event21F22 or a day of remembrance connected in a more 
general sense to preventing and combating violence against ethnic and/or religious 
groups.22F23 Parliamentary determinations can also be related to debates regarding genocide 
denial and financial compensation or other forms of reparation, including the making of 
formal apologies.  
 
Two general points drawn from this brief overview can be carried forward to the analysis 
below. First, there seems to be a certain degree of selectivity. Parliaments appear to be 
more prepared to make determinations of genocide in cases where mass killings were not 
perpetrated in or by their own state or in cases in which the victims were their own 
nationals and the killings took place in another era (Holodomor). Adopting a selective 
stance carries political risks, as will be discussed in the section on desirability. 
 
Second, a distinction can be made between determinations regarding historical genocides 
on the one hand and mass killings perpetrated in an ongoing conflict on the other. This 
distinction has legal relevance. In relation to historical genocides, the primary legal issues 
pertain to reparations and apologies. In turn, legal issues pertaining to the obligation to 
prevent genocide and crimes against humanity are particularly relevant where they relate to 
determinations concerning ongoing situations. In this advisory report, the EVA and the 
CAVV have confined themselves to addressing determinations regarding ongoing 
situations.  
 
                                                 
18 Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Niema 
Movassat, Wolfgang Gehrcke, Christine Buchholz, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion Die Linke, 
Drucksache 18/8859 (Sachstand der Verhandlungen zum Versöhnungsprozess mit Namibia und zur 
Aufarbeitung des Völkermordes an den Herero und Nama), Drucksache 18/9152, 11 July 2016. 
19 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Про Голодомор 1932-1933 років в Україні, N 50, ст.504 (Law on the 
Holodomor of 1932-33 in Ukraine, Document Nº 376-V), adoption November 2006, date of entry into force 1 
December 2006. 
20 UK House of Commons, Early Day Motion 1008, 26 January 2016.  
21 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Journals, 42nd Parl., 1st sess., Sitting no. 97, 25 October 2016, 
910-913. 
22 E.g. EP Resolution, 15 January 2009 (day of remembrance for Srebrenica); Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe Resolution 1723 (2010), 28 April 2010 (commemorating the victims of the Great Famine 
(Holodomor) in Ukraine (1932–1933)).  






The first question that the motion poses concerns the scope parliament has for using the 
terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’. 
 
There is no rule of international law that would prevent governments or parliaments from 
making a determination that ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ have been, are being 
or are about to be committed in a certain state.  
 
The motion suggests that only the courts can make such determinations. This is a position 
that needs to be qualified. It is inherent in the international law system that states 
pronounce on questions of international law. Often there is no judicial body with the 
necessary jurisdiction, and international law would lose a great deal of its efficacy if it 
could not be applied without court decisions. In principle, therefore, it is up to states to 
make pronouncements on conduct of other states or persons that is relevant to international 
law.23F24 This implies, too, that parliaments are not fettered by any rule prescribing that only 
courts are permitted to pronounce on genocide or crimes against humanity. 
 
In this context, it is important to emphasise that, under international law, parliamentary 
determinations have a different legal significance than the acts of a government. From a 
legal perspective, states operate by means of their organs and in principle it is national law 
that determines which organs make up the state. This is not to say that each organ of state 
has the same significance in international relations.24F25 For instance, in treaty negotiations, 
only the government of a state and, acting on its behalf, the head of state, head of 
government or the minister of foreign affairs have the authority to perform all the acts 
required to conclude a treaty. Other individuals may be able to perform certain acts that 
bind the state but only within the limits of the authority vested in them by the government 
of the state. With respect to the development of customary international law, in principle 
the acts of all organs of the state can contribute to this process. In particular, the 
determinations and positions expressed by the government both within and outside 
parliament can be deemed to be expressions of state practice and as such can contribute to 
the development of customary international law.25F26  
 
As the chief representative of the state in international relations, it is up to the government 
to determine that genocide or crimes against humanity have been or are being committed in 
another state.  
 
                                                 
24 Or as stated in 1978 by the Arbitral Tribunal in its ruling in the case concerning the Air Service Agreement 
of 1946 between the United States of America and France: ‘Under the rules of present-day international law, 
[…], each State establishes for itself its legal situation vis-à-vis other States”, Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards, vol. XVIII, pp. 417-493, para. 81. 
25 See also Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal 
obligations, in particular Guiding Principle 4, UN Doc. A/61/10. 
26 Cf. ILC Rapporteur Michael Wood, Second Report on the Identification of Customary International Law, 




This does not mean that parliament cannot express an independent position, for example by 
adopting a motion. One could even say that, in a democratic legal order such as that in the 
Netherlands, parliament has an obvious contribution to make in forming a judgment as to 
whether or not certain conduct constitutes genocide or crimes against humanity. However, 
positions taken by parliaments have no special significance in international law. 
 
Besides making independent pronouncements on genocide and crimes against humanity, 
parliament can exert influence via the government, by inviting it to adopt the position that 
an act of genocide or crimes against humanity have occurred. If the government takes such 
a position at the request of parliament, this could have significance in international law (see 
section 4). 
 
Although there are no obstacles in international law preventing governments or parliaments 
from using the terms ‘genocide’ or ‘crimes against humanity’, it is the view of the EVA 




 Thorough investigation of the facts is essential and in the absence of sufficiently 
reliable findings of fact, restraint is to be preferred.  
Legal precepts are applied to facts. Consequently, a determination that an international 
standard has been violated can be made only on the basis of a rigorous and meticulous 
investigation of the facts. Determinations of genocide and crimes against humanity are 
extremely serious and it is essential that they be based upon thorough investigation. 
Furthermore, in determining whether particular conduct constitutes genocide, it is 
necessary to ascertain whether the acts were committed with the intent to destroy a 
particular group, as set out above. The burden of proof is substantial. In the absence of 
sufficiently reliable findings of fact, restraint is to be preferred. 
 
 
 Given the Netherlands’ commitment to advancing the international legal order, the 
preferred course of action is to support international determinations, but this need 
not be a reason to delay making national determinations.  
Given the Netherlands’ commitment to advancing the international legal order, the 




determinations made by the relevant UN bodies.26F27 A distinction can be made between 
(i) determinations by the UN Security Council or the General Assembly, in which the 
underlying facts are not stated in detail, (ii) determinations by UN commissions of 
inquiry, in which facts are ascertained and characterized in a more detailed and 
meticulous fashion, and (iii) determinations made by international courts and criminal 
tribunals.  
 
The EVA and the CAVV see a role for parliament in calling for international 
procedures such as these to be carried out, in particular UN inquiries. 
 
The preference for determinations to be made at international level need not be seen as 
a reason for delaying determinations at national level. It is also important to stress that 
not all international determinations are worthy of support; parliaments and governments 
should not base their own determinations on international findings that are merely 




The EVA and the CAVV have interpreted the question regarding the significance of using 
the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ as an inquiry into the legal 
implications, in particular for the Netherlands, of making such a determination.  
 
In subsection 4.1 the obligation to prevent and punish the crime of genocide is examined 
more closely. Subsection 4.2 addresses the legal basis and substance of obligations to 
prevent and punish crimes against humanity and the extent to which these obligations differ 
from those pertaining to genocide. Subsection 4.3 explains that the two crimes are of equal 
gravity. Lastly, subsection 4.4 presents an interim conclusion that, because there is no 
essential difference in the gravity of the two crimes, the obligations to prevent them should, 
in substance, be the same too. More generally, this subsection asserts that the difference 
between genocide and crimes against humanity is irrelevant in the prevention phase, and 
that attention (including that of parliaments) should not be focused on terminological issues 
but rather on specifying the obligation to prevent both crimes and, in particular, which 
preventive acts and measures are called for.  
 
  
                                                 
27 A similar position was adopted in a debate in the Canadian House of Commons about whether the 
Canadian government should characterise the violence committed by Islamic State (IS) against the 
Yazidis as genocide. Initially, a majority of Liberal MPs voted against a motion to that effect, because in 
their view the international authorities, and the UN Security Council in particular, should decide on this 




4.1  The obligation to prevent and punish genocide  
 
The obligation to prevent and punish genocide arises from article 1 of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The obligation to prevent 
genocide is vaguely formulated and the Convention provides no further specification of 
what it precisely entails. The only provision that gives any further detail is article 8, which 
allows Contracting Parties to the Convention to call upon the competent organs of the 
United Nations to take action under the Charter of the United Nations. The obligation to 
prevent stated in article 1 of the Convention must be interpreted within the confines of the 
UN Charter and does not provide an independent basis for military intervention beyond the 
scope of the UN Charter. The R2P doctrine,27F28 which emphasises the responsibility of every 
state and the international community to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, can be seen as a further specification of 
these provisions of the Genocide Convention. As the Advisory Council on International 
Affairs (AIV) stressed in a 2010 advisory report, this doctrine likewise cannot serve as an 
autonomous basis for the use of force without the authorisation of the UN Security 
Council.28F29 The obligation to prevent genocide therefore does not in itself directly give rise 
to a duty to engage in military intervention, nor does it provide any legal justification for 
such an intervention. 
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro case (referred to below as ‘the 
Genocide Case’) the International Court of Justice made it clear that the obligation to 
prevent is a binding legal norm, not just a moral principle. The most important questions 
are who is subject to this obligation, what the obligation entails, and precisely what 
circumstances activate the obligation. The ICJ’s judgment in the Genocide Case went some 
way to answering these questions. The Court found that the obligation to prevent is not 
limited by territory.29F30 However, it added that the substance of the obligation to prevent 
genocide depends on the state’s ‘capacity to influence the action of persons likely to 
commit, or already committing genocide’ and that this ‘varies greatly from one state to 
another’.30F31 Factors that determine a state’s capacity to exercise influence include (i) the 
geographical distance from the state in question or the locality of the events, (ii) the 
closeness of political relations or other ties between the state and the most important actors 
in the events, (iii) the legal position of the state vis-à-vis the situation and those at risk of or 
being subjected to genocide, (iv) the state’s degree of awareness of events.31F32 The ICJ also 
ruled that the obligation to prevent is one of conduct, not one of result that would require a 
state to succeed in preventing the commission of genocide.32F33 In addition the ICJ specified 
that the obligation to prevent arises when a state becomes or should have become aware of 
                                                 
28 Outcome Document of the World Summit, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, paras. 138-139. 
29 AIV, ‘The Netherlands and the Responsibility to Protect: The Responsibility to Protect People from Mass 
Atrocities’, Advisory report number 70, June 2010. 
30 ICJ, Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 26 February 2007, para. 183. Referred to 
below as the ‘Genocide Case’.  
31 Genocide Case, para. 430. 
32 Genocide Case, para. 432. 
33 Genocide Case, para. 430. 
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the existence of a serious risk of genocide being committed.33F34 Despite these clarifications, 
the obligation to prevent has not as yet been fully defined. The precise substance of the 
obligation and in particular what types of preventive actions and measures states are 
expected to take remain largely unspecified.  
 
The obligation to punish is more concrete in nature and is elaborated in multiple provisions 
of the Genocide Convention. It includes an obligation for states to cooperate with the 
international tribunals whose jurisdiction they have accepted. The Rome Statute, too, refers 
to the duty to prosecute international crimes. That being said, neither the Genocide 
Convention nor the Rome Statute explicitly requires states to establish universal 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, a relatively large number of states, including the Netherlands, 
have implemented the Rome Statute in a way that creates universal jurisdiction over the 
crimes enumerated in the Statute. Clearly, prosecutors and courts, at both national and 
international level, have a decisive role to play in fulfilling the duty to punish perpetrators 
of international crimes. In addition, other national and international bodies have an 
independent responsibility to facilitate trial. The Syria Investigative Mechanism recently 
established by the UN General Assembly is a fitting example of an expression of this 
responsibility.  
 
4.2  The obligation to prevent and punish crimes against humanity  
 
The prohibition on genocide is contained in an international treaty regime that explicitly 
formulates states’ obligations to prevent and punish genocide. There is no separate 
convention on crimes against humanity. The Genocide Case provides no clarification of the 
legal basis and substance of the obligations to prevent and punish crimes against humanity, 
or the extent to which these obligations differ from those relating to genocide. The ICJ 
clearly indicated that its judgment in that case pertained exclusively to the obligation to 
prevent genocide and that it did not intend to make any pronouncement on a general duty 
of states to prevent other violations of international law.34F35 Nevertheless, an obligation to 
prevent crimes against humanity could be based on customary international law. 
 
In his preparatory work for an international convention on crimes against humanity, Sean 
Murphy, Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission (ILC), addresses the 
existence, substance and scope of an obligation to prevent crimes against humanity.35F36 He 
provides a detailed analysis of the obligation to prevent in various conventions on human 
rights and transnational crimes. With reference to these international instruments and the 
ICJ judgment in the Genocide Case, the ILC adopted, in 2015, draft article 4, containing a 
general obligation to prevent crimes against humanity, complemented by a more specific 
obligation for states to take measures to prevent these crimes in territory under their 
jurisdiction.36F37 The differentiation in draft article 4 between obligations for territorial states 
and other states is consistent with ICJ case law. Until such time as a provision similar to 
draft article 4 is incorporated into a convention, the obligation to prevent crimes against 
                                                 
34 Genocide Case, para. 431. 
35 Genocide Case, para. 429. 
36 First Report on Crimes Against Humanity, UN Doc. A/CN.4/680, 17 February 2015, part V. 
37 ILC Report, UN Doc. A/70/10, 2015, paras. 108-117. 
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humanity must be based on customary international law or on more specific instruments 
such as those enumerated in Special Rapporteur Murphy’s report. In the case of crimes 
against humanity, too, the substance of the obligation of prevention needs to be further 
specified. 
 
With respect to the obligation to punish perpetrators of crimes against humanity, the 
absence of a separate convention elaborating this obligation is offset to some extent by the 
Rome Statute. Most states parties to the Statute have incorporated its definition of crimes 
against humanity in their national criminal law, in some cases making provision for 
universal jurisdiction as in the case of genocide. The Netherlands has done this in the 
International Crimes Act (Wet internationale misdrijven, WIM). As observed above, the 
Public Prosecution Service and the courts bear the largest share of the responsibility for 
fulfilling the obligation to punish. The Public Prosecution Service’s role comprises 
conducting criminal investigations and initiating prosecutions. In addition, it is inherent in 
criminal law that individual criminal responsibility must be established by the court in 
accordance with certain procedural safeguards. Also other organs of the state may have a 
responsibility to enable the state to fulfil its obligation, for example by facilitating trial. 
 
4.3  Is genocide more serious than crimes against humanity? 
 
A question that arises from the foregoing is whether the obligation to prevent genocide is 
or should be the same as the obligation to prevent crimes against humanity, or whether 
there is reason to take a different approach to each of them. An argument for equating the 
two obligations on substance and taking the same approach would be that the two crimes 
are closely related in nature and substance and in terms of the development of the law. An 
argument for taking different approaches would be that genocide is more serious and 
therefore requires a more rigid regime. This subsection examines the question as to whether 
there is indeed a difference in severity between the two crimes. 
 
Genocide is sometimes called ‘the crime of crimes’,37F38 which suggests that it is the most 
serious international crime there is. Emotionally and intuitively people tend to believe that 
genocide is more serious, and this is expressed in a strong desire for this particular label to 
be used to condemn certain crimes. The term ‘crimes against humanity’ is more generic, 
and consequently may not evoke the same immediate associations and emotions as 
genocide. Whether acts of genocide are actually deemed more serious than crimes against 
humanity depends upon the point of reference. If intention is the point of reference, it could 
be argued that genocide is the more serious of the two because it is committed with the 
intention of destroying a group; this intention is not a necessary criterion for conduct to be 
characterized as a crime against humanity. If scale or the brutality of the underlying 
conduct is taken as the point of reference, in specific cases crimes against humanity may be 
more serious than acts of genocide, making it impossible to generalise that one is 
inherently more serious than the other. Another argument against hierarchical classification 
is that ranking the two crimes in this way would also lead to groups of victims being 
                                                 
38 W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 
2009. See also ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 2 October 1998, para. 8; ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Musema, 
27 January 2000, para. 981; ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, 6 December 1999, para. 451. 
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ranked hierarchically: those targeted by crimes against humanity would be deemed to be 
victims of a less serious crime. This is not desirable; the case law of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) repeatedly and emphatically states that genocide and crimes 
against humanity are equally grave offences.38F39  
 
Likewise, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur was clear on this point: 
 
‘[G]enocide is not necessarily the most serious international crime. Depending upon the 
circumstances, such international offences as crimes against humanity or large scale war 
crimes may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.’39F40 
 
Given the emotive value that the genocide label has for many people, the Darfur 
commission felt obliged to add: 
 
‘The conclusion that no genocidal policy has been pursued and implemented in Darfur by the 
Government authorities, directly or through the militias under their control, should not be taken 
as in any way detracting from or belittling the gravity of the crimes perpetrated in that region.’40F41 
 
Consequently, the question as to whether genocide is, in a legal sense, a more serious 
offence than crimes against humanity is generally answered in the negative. In individual 
cases, however, it is possible to differentiate between the two, for example in sentencing, 
but the underlying complex of facts is more likely to play a decisive role than the 
characterisation of those facts as such.  
 
  
                                                 
39 ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, 1 June 2001, para. 367 (‘[...] there is no hierarchy of 
crimes under the Statute, and [...] all of the crimes specified therein are “serious violations of international 
humanitarian law”, capable of attracting the same sentence.’); ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Semanza, 15 May 
2003, para. 555 (‘All of the crimes in the Statute are crimes of an extremely serious nature, rising to the level 
of international prohibition.’); ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tadić, Opinion of Judge Cassese, 26 January 2000, 
para. 7 (‘...one cannot say that a certain class of international crimes encompasses facts that are more serious 
than those prohibited under a different criminal provision. In abstracto all international crimes are serious 
offences and no hierarchy of gravity may a priori be established between them.’).  
40 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Violations of International Humanitarian Law and 




4.4  Interim conclusion: differentiation not necessary in the prevention phase 
 
Genocide and crimes against humanity are closely related, even largely overlapping 
offences. It therefore stands to reason that the obligation to prevent each of them should be 
deemed to be the same in terms of nature, substance and scope. If it is assumed that the 
obligation to prevent is the same for genocide and crimes against humanity, there is no 
need to differentiate between the two in the prevention phase. This position is consistent 
with the way in which the R2P doctrine is formulated. The Responsibility to Protect applies 
to both genocide and crimes against humanity. In addition, it bears mentioning that the 
recent French-Mexican proposal to restrict the right of veto in the Security Council (which 
the Netherlands supports) does not distinguish between the two offences either. This 
proposal uses the non-legal term mass atrocities, thereby emphasising that in the context of 
prevention, differentiating between international crimes is not of paramount importance.41F42 
In keeping with this, it would be preferable to consistently use the terms ‘genocide’ and 
‘crimes against humanity’ together during the prevention phase, so that attention can be 
focused on continuing to equalise and specify the substance and scope of the obligation to 
prevent both crimes. This recommendation is directed towards both the government and 
parliament. Only the courts will distinguish between the two terms, in establishing liability; 




The third part of the question posed in the motion concerns the desirability of politicians’ 
using the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’. In light of the foregoing 
analysis, the EVA and the CAVV would make the following observations in this respect.  
 
 A necessary step on the road to prevention and intervention 
Use of the term ‘genocide’ or ‘crimes against humanity’ may constitute an important 
first step on the road to political decision-making on prevention and intervention,42F43 thus 
serving various interests (e.g. preventing further suffering, stopping refugee flows, 
etc.). As the previous section set out, international law imposes an obligation to 
prevent. The steps that actually need to be taken to prevent such crimes require a 
political decision-making process, which must be prompted by the use of these terms 
by politicians. Parliament can play an important role either by calling on the 
government to make a determination or by making a determination itself. 
 
As stated above, determinations of this nature should not be impeded by linguistic and 
legalistic discussions about the precise definition and specific use of the term 
‘genocide’; such debates have in the past formed obstacles to timely and effective 
prevention.43F44 In the light of the close connection between genocide and crimes against 
                                                 
42 See also the Code of Conduct of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group, VN Doc. 
A/70/621-S/2015/978, 14 December 2015.  
43 Booker & Colgan, in: Straus, S., ‘Darfur and the Genocide Debate’, Foreign Affairs, 84:1 (2005), p. 8.  
44 Beardsley, B., ‘The Endless Debate over the ‘G Word’, Genocide Studies and Prevention, 1:1 (2006), p. 79. 
15 
 
humanity it is neither necessary nor desirable to differentiate in the prevention phase 
between the two offences, as explained above. 
 
 International cooperation  
Determinations of genocide and crimes against humanity can also play an important 
role in bringing about international cooperation. Use of the terms ‘genocide’ and 
‘crimes against humanity’ makes a strong moral and political appeal to other actors 
(e.g., states and international organisations) and public opinion. Because a state on its 
own is usually helpless in the face of impending or ongoing genocide or crimes against 
humanity, timely political recognition and acknowledgment of these international 
crimes is often the first step towards achieving the international cooperation necessary 
for intervention or prevention.44F45  
 
Using the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ may, as stated above, be a 
necessary step in fulfilling the Responsibility to Protect.45F46  
 
 Interpreting the obligation to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity  
As set out in section 3, what the obligation to prevent genocide and crimes against 
humanity exactly entails has not yet been clearly defined. Governments and parliaments 
can play a useful role by calling for or deciding on concrete measures aimed at 
prevention, and by doing so contribute to the further specification of this obligation.  
 
In assessing whether it is desirable for parliaments to make determinations regarding 
genocide and crimes against humanity, it is, however, important to take into account the 
considerations set out in section 3 regarding the importance of conducting thorough 
investigations and supporting international determinations.  
 
 Political risks in international relations 
The EVA and the CAVV would observe that the use of the terms ‘genocide’ and 
‘crimes against humanity’ also carries political risks. Unilateral use of these terms may 
render the state concerned part of a ‘hegemonic Western discourse’, which is not 
necessarily the most effective approach politically speaking. Using these terms is 
tantamount to an accusation against a foreign government and can prove 
counterproductive, for example when prevention measures necessitate obtaining that 
government’s consent to the deployment of UN peacekeepers46F47 or even an international 
fact-finding commission. In this respect, too, reference is made to the remarks in 
section 3 on the preference for international determinations. 
 
 
                                                 
45 General Assembly, Security Council, ‘Mobilizing collective action: The next decade of the responsibility to 
protect’, VN Doc. A/70/999-A/2016/620, 22 July 2016, pp. 12, 18. 
46 Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, para. 138-139.  
47 Mennecke, M., ‘What’s in a Name? Reflections on Using, Not Using, and Overusing the “G-Word”’, 
Genocide Studies and Prevention, 2:1 (2007), p. 61. 
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 Devaluation of the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ 
If, after the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’ are used, effective 
measures are not taken, this can have the effect of devaluing these terms. The resulting 
disconnection between their use and concrete legal and political consequences 




6. Conclusion and recommendations 
The advice given in this report can be summarised in 10 statements: 
 
1. The assertion that only the courts can make a determination as to whether conduct 
meets the legal definition of genocide or crimes against humanity needs to be 
qualified.  
 
2. As the chief representative of the state in international relations, the government 
bears primary responsibility for determining that genocide or crimes against 
humanity have been or are being committed in another state. 
 
3. It is possible for a parliament to adopt an autonomous position but such a position 
has no special significance in international law. Parliament can invite the 
government to take the position that genocide or crimes against humanity have been 
or are being committed. 
 
4. Although both governments and parliaments are at liberty to speak out about 
genocide and crimes against humanity, restraint is in order.  
a. A thorough investigation of the facts is essential and in the absence of 
sufficient and reliable findings of fact, restraint is to be preferred. 
b. Given the Netherlands’ commitment to advancing the international legal 
order, the preferred course of action is to support international 
determinations, but this need not be a reason to delay making national 
determinations. 
 
5. A determination that genocide or crimes against humanity are being or have been 
committed is a necessary first step in activating obligations, such as the obligation 
to prevent.  
 
                                                 
48 Glanville, L., ‘Is “Genocide” still a powerful word?’, Journal of Genocide Research, 11:4 (2009), p. 482. 
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6. The precise substance of the obligation to prevent and the measures states are 
expected to take have not yet been clearly established. This is the case for both 
genocide and crimes against humanity. 
 
7. Because genocide and crimes against humanity are closely connected, equivalent in 
terms of their nature and gravity, and largely overlap, the substance of the 
obligation to prevent should be the same for both offences. 
 
8. The EVA and the CAVV recommend that there should be no differentiation 
between genocide and crimes against humanity during the prevention phase. They 
also advise using the two terms together as standard practice so that attention is 
focused not on terminological debates but on the more relevant question of what 
preventive acts and measures should be taken or continued.  
 
9. Governments and parliaments can help further the development of the obligations 
to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity by calling for or deciding on 
concrete prevention measures. 
 
10. The EVA and the CAVV recommend that the government support the ILC’s efforts 
with respect to drafting a separate convention on crimes against humanity. In this 
context, too, the obligation to prevent can be elaborated and further specified, and 
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Date     19 December 2016 
Re Request for advice on the use of the term ‘genocide’ by politicians 
 
  
Dear Professors,  
 
On 29 November 2016 the House of Representatives adopted a motion48F49 requesting that the 
government obtain advice from the External Adviser on Public International Law (EVA) and the 
Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law (CAVV) and ask them to prepare a 
joint report. The motion reads as follows: 
 
‘The House,  
 
having heard the deliberations,  
 
observing that the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe and the United States House of Representatives have characterised the atrocities 
committed by ISIS against Yazidis, Kurds, Christians and other ethnic and religious 
minorities, and against Muslims who disagree with ISIS’s extremist interpretation of 
Islam, as crimes against humanity and genocide;  
 
considering that establishing whether conduct meets the legal definition of genocide is 
always a determination to be made by a court but that such determinations often take 
years, while the political recognition that the crime has been committed is of great 
importance, not least to enable the affected groups to process their grief;  
 
requests that the government commission an advisory opinion from the External Adviser 
on Public International Law (Extern Volkenrechtelijk Adviseur, EVA) and the Advisory 
                                                 
49 Motion submitted by MP Joël Voordewind et al., Adoption of the budget statement of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs for the year 2017, Parliamentary Paper 34 550 V, no. 32, proposed on 24 November 2016. 
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Committee on Issues of Public International Law (Commissie van advies inzake 
volkenrechtelijke vraagstukken, CAVV) and to request that they prepare a joint report for 
the purpose of creating clarity regarding the scope for and desirability and significance of 
politicians using the term “genocide”, both in general and in related to the 
aforementioned atrocities in the Middle East .’ 
 
I hereby ask you and your Committee to draft a joint advisory report in accordance with this 
motion. In view of the deliberations on the motion in the House of Representatives, the use of the 
term ‘crimes against humanity’ could also be examined in the report, if so desired. 
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